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Radio Portugal Publicizes Spanish Unrest

Radio Portugal has begun a nightly half-hour broadcast, in Spanish, that gives prominence to anti-regime activities in Spain.

The program, beamed to Europe since January 28, has been calling attention to civil and labor unrest in Spain and to demands by Spanish groups for political rights.

Last November, a Spanish official told a US embassy officer that his government had complained to Lisbon about occasional anti-Spanish commentaries on Radio Portugal. During the discussion, the Spanish representative said he was aware of Portuguese plans to initiate regular broadcasts in Spanish and warned that Spanish radio and television transmitters could blanket Portugal with broadcasts in Portuguese.

This week, the trade union of the Portuguese public entertainment workers issued a communique supporting eight Spanish actors recently arrested for striking. The union sent a cable to the Spanish government and its ambassador in Lisbon protesting the arrests and demanding that the actors be released.

The Spanish have not yet reacted to the new broadcasts or to the cabled protest. Spain is sure to see both as Portuguese interference in Spain's affairs and is not likely to let them pass unchallenged.

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Increased Soviet Purchases Will Help Narrow Trade Gap with Iceland

The Soviet Union will purchase \$33.5 million worth of fish and fish meal from Iceland in 1975. This is the largest single purchase ever made by the Soviets from Iceland.

Iceland imports mainly oil from the Soviet Union which supplies Iceland with 80 percent of its oil needs. The quadrupling of the price of oil over the last two years has produced a serious trade imbalance. The new purchase agreement will help alleviate trade problems between the two countries.

Although trade problems may be eased, Iceland is increasingly nervous about its dependency on the Soviet Union for oil. Some prominent Icelanders have suggested that Reykjavik begin looking to other oil suppliers. Others view the situation as political blackmail, claiming that the Soviets are using trade as a weapon to draw Iceland away from the West.

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CSCE, MBFR and the Neutrals

CSCE's military security committee has begun to discuss the relationship between the conference and present and future European arms control and disarmament negotiations.

CSCE and MBFR have, of course, been linked informally throughout their history, more often tactically than substantively. Both East and West attach some importance to the way in which the connection is treated in CSCE documents. The East will be looking for language that stresses the importance of security conference agreements as guidelines for future East-West relations. The West will be guarding against any precedent the East could use to its advantage in other negotiations.

At the moment, the focus of the discussion is narrower: how to handle the desire of the neutral CSCE participants to stay informed about, and perhaps even to present their views at, arms control negotiations. Ideally, the neutrals would like firm language in CSCE documents to give them the right to do these things. The Western allies think it would be a needlessly complicating factor in negotiations such as MBFR if neutral nations were to turn up from time to time to express their views. The allies are perfectly willing, however, to acknowledge the right of the neutrals to be kept informed and to make their views known bilaterally.

Satisfying the desires of the neutrals on such points as these at CSCE is more important than it might immediately seem. The conference proceeds on the basis of "consensus," which in this context means that measures can be approved only if no participant voices an objection. It is at least conceivable, therefore, that one of the more irascible neutral participants, Malta, for example, could postpone the conclusion of the conference even after substantial East-West agreement had been reached.

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Italian Neo-Fascists Block Government Radio-TV Proposal

The neo-fascist Italian Social Movement has succeeded in blocking parliamentary approval of a government proposal to reorganize the Italian state radio-TV network. Although the neo-fascist victory does not pose an immediate threat to the survival of the Moro government, it is an embarrassing defeat that will keep alive the controversy over the radio-TV issue and probably provoke another divisive battle in parliament.

A court decision last year struck down the laws that had permitted the dominant Christian Democrats to exercise monopoly control over the network for years. In the negotiations for new legislation, other parties—including the Communists—were awarded seats on the committee set up to oversee the operation of the network. The neo-fascists—who have the fourth largest parliamentary representation—were arbitrarily excluded, however, and this triggered their obstructionist campaign in the legislature.

The government had presented the proposal as a decree law, and the neo-fascists resorted to the tactic of introducing literally thousands of amendments in order to stretch consideration of the law beyond the 60-day limit within which parliament must act on decree legislation. When it became apparent that the deadline could not be met, the government introduced another bill which left out the sections offensive to the neo-fascists.

The Socialists probably bear the major responsibility for the government's inability to push the radio-TV law through parliament. Most government leaders were reportedly willing to work out a compromise with the neo-fascists, but the Socialists adamantly opposed any such deal. Fear of provoking a split in his majority made Prime Minister Moro a hostage to the Socialists' intransigence and kept him wedded to a losing strategy.

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Moro's troubles with the radio-TV issue are far from over, even though the neo-fascists may now be less troublesome. In parliamentary debate on the new version of the law, the Socialists may try to restore it to its original form. They may also push for the adoption of some controversial changes in parliamentary procedure proposed in the aftermath of the neo-fascists' successful obstructionism.

Right-wing Christian Democrats moreover, are not reconciled to their party's loss of control over radio-TV policy. In order to hold dissident Christian Democrats in line during the initial round of debate, Moro had to call a vote of confidence on a Liberal Party amendment that would have effectively killed the government proposal. Moro may have to resort to this risky tactic again if the final version of the radio-TV law is not acceptable to all segments of his party.

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Turkey's Plans for Aegean Operations Foiled

Turkey's plans to explore for oil in the Aegean have been frustrated for now by the refusal of the Norwegian research ship Longva to operate in disputed areas.

The Turkish government has announced that it has cancelled the Longva's contract because of the owners' non-compliance with instructions. Energy Minister Isil told the Turkish senate that the government had previously ordered seismographic equipment and if no other foreign ship will take the contract to explore in the Aegean, Turkey will equip one of its own vessels and proceed on its own.

The Turks are angry over this development, claiming that the Greek government put intense pressure on the Norwegians. A Turkish foreign ministry official remarked that the Greek efforts had been unwise because the alternative to using the Longva would be to send in a Turkish naval vessel, which would increase the risk of an incident.

Turkey does not at present have a ship equipped to conduct the type of operations the Longva was scheduled to do, and it is likely to take some time to outfit a ship for the job. Unless the Turks decide to show the flag in the disputed areas of the Aegean by sending in a ship with only limited research capabilities, the delay will give Turkish and Greek diplomats more time to defuse the issue. The foreign ministers of the two countries are expected to meet on the subject to determine the specific questions that will be referred to the International Court of Justice. The timing for such a meeting has not yet been established.

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Spain and the US Conclude Third Round of Negotiations on US Base Rights

The third round of negotiations between the US and Spain concluded on a positive note earlier this week, although little progress was made in reaching agreement on concrete issues.

For the first time, the head of the Spanish delegation appeared to accept US arguments that a US security guarantee was not possible and agreed to broaden the discussion beyond this item. Previously the Spaniards had said that without agreement on a guarantee they would not go on to other matters of prime interest to the US, such as the negotiation of base facilities.

The Spaniards showed particular interest in prospects for developing a combined military planning group which they may be beginning to view as a substitute for a security guarantee. They proposed putting US facilities on a new footing based on a defense "partnership," including combined planning to meet an agreed threat, rather than payments in cash and military equipment. Differences arose over the question of a command function which the Spaniards want for the proposed planning group, and this will be discussed during the next round in Washington next month.

The Spaniards did not raise the issue of US support of Moroccan claims to the Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. The reassurances extended to the Spaniards last week that the Moroccans would not have US support may have prevented this issue from casting a shadow over the negotiations.

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